Saturday, 28 November 2015

28th NOV 1956 CHOU EN LAI VISIT INDIA

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Zhou en Lai & Nehru: what went wrong?

The 40th death anniversary of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru falls on May 27. K R N Swamy recollects the relationship between Nehru and the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou en Lai.

Historians agree that the death of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India was hastened by the Chinese defeat of India in 1962 and the way Zhou en Lai, the Prime Minister of China outwitted him. Nehru had planned for a friendly India-China, with an open border between the two nations like USA and Canada, so that the saved defence expenses could be diverted to nation-building activities. But Zhou had no such inhibitions and practiced real politick that of cutting down India to size.

Archives state that in August 1939, when Nehru visited China as a delegate of the Congress party and met many political leaders, Zhou in the opposition as a Communist leader was anxious to confer with him. But due to the breakout of the Second World War Nehru had to return to India cutting short the visit and it was 15 years later in 1954 that they could meet. One historian feels if these two emerging leaders of Asia had met in 1939. they might have developed a camaraderie, it would have helped them resolve matters that arose when they became prime ministers. In 1947 Nehru took over as the Prime Minister of India and Zhou became his counterpart in China in 1949.

In 1954, Chou En Lai arrived in New Delhi and an official banquet was arranged for him. It was during this visit that the famous Panch Sheel Doctrine - five principles of peaceful co-existence was formulated. There seems to have been a desultory mention of the border problems - “incorrect maps” as the Chinese called them. Two years earlier in 1952, the Indian Army had warned that the Chinese were building a road in Indian territory of Aksaichin. Unfortunately the implications were lost on Nehru. Once they built the road, the Chinese became truculent and began to talk of borders imposed by “British Imperialists”.

Then came the Bandung Conference of Non-aligned Nations in 1955. It was to be China’s first foray into international politics. Nehru, ebullient that history was in the making, as India and China were entering the world forum as friends, introduced Zhou to other leaders. As one commentator remarks “Both Zhou and Nehru were well educated statesmen from the upper class, both had swung around to a radical view of politics. They were the aristocrats, sophisticates and internationalists in political parties which had been led by those far more earthy and anchored characters - Mahatma Gandhi and Mao. Nehru was nine years older than Zhou and “naturally he felt like an elder brother to him.”

Historians aver that these sentiments were wasted, as Zhou felt offended at Bandung, as if a new boy was being introduced to his classmates. India and China were called the twin pillars of Bandung Conference, but Nehru had not realised how much India was being undermined by Zhou. In 1955 Nehru paid a State visit to China and came back hurt at the patronising attitude taken by Mao, Zhou and other Chinese leaders towards India. Meanwhile the Chinese incursions into India continued and in 1956, when Chou visited India, Zhou seems to have had an idea that he could tell Nehru that China would accept the Macmahon line as the border in North East India in return for the Aksaichin plateau. But the Indian public opinion indicated to Nehru, that there could not be any real parity until India regained the territory taken by China.

The first armed clash between India and China took place in Longju in the Ladakh in 1959. Meanwhile the asylum given by India to the Dalai Lama put an end to any hopes of reconciliation, although another effort towards mending fences led to Zhou’s visit to India in 1960. Arriving at the Indian Prime Minister’s residence, Zhou claims that he was shocked to see Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi welcoming him, herself clad in a Tibetan dress. Zhou felt that it was a deliberate attempt to offend him. His attempts to convince other prominent Indians of the rightness of China’s demands ended in failure. In fact Zhou walked out of the meeting with Morarji Desai.

Then came the Chinese victory over India in 1962, and the unilateral withdrawal of Chinese forces to the pre-war borders (except in Aksaichin). In Chinese political circles the opinion was that, China as a mighty nation could afford to be forgiving to a smaller country like India and Chinese newspapers compared Nehru to the mythical Burmese warrior Mon On, who attacked China seven times and was every time, captured, pardoned and released to go back to his own country, until overcame by remorse at attacking such a magnanimous neighbour, Mon On turned to be a grateful vassal.

But Zhou seem to have been dismayed at the pro-India attitude shown by some of the important Non Aligned nations, especially Nasser - the Egyptian Prime Minister and Habib Bourguiba - the Tunisian President, who berated him openly in a diplomatic function in Tunis for attacking India!

In January 1963, Zhou’s verbal message to Nehru, through the Indian Ambassador to China P K Bannerjee that “war has never solved any problem. The need is to search for peace and for understanding. I do understand Mr Nehru’s difficulties, but he must also try to understand my difficulties”, elicited no reply from Nehru.

In April 1963 the eminent Chinese journalist Han Suyin met Nehru and told him, “Zhou holds you in high esteem.” Nehru told her, “I have had enough of Zhou’s friendship.” Going back to China, Han Suyin met the Chinese Prime Minister and told him “I think Nehru is ill. He is imprecise in speech.” Zhou scathingly replied “he has been saying imprecise things for a long time.”

The Mandarin had no further use of the Pandit.



Scarred by 1962 war, Nehru destroyed message from China premier

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October 22, 2012 21:57 IST

'He struck a match, and held the paper to the flames... He said it would take more than a quarter of a century to return to any substantive negotiation, provided the Chinese refrained from another attack on India.'
The scars of the 1962 war ran too deep for Jawaharlal Nehru, recalls former diplomat Kishan S Rana.
India-China relations in the past 50 years have been marked by a paradox. While India still carries scars of the 1962 border war, China hugely underestimated for many years the impact of the war on India.
P K Banerjee headed the Indian embassy in Beijing from June 1961 to December 1963; his book My Peking Memoirs of The Chinese Invasion of India, (Clarion, Delhi, 1990) has received far less attention than it deserves; it details Chinese efforts to engage India in political dialogue.
PKB had seven substantive meetings with Premier Zhou en-Lai, between the outbreak of the border war and 1963, besides his farewell call. (Interestingly, the Chinese charge d'affaires in New Delhi was not a communication channel.)
On October 24, Premier Zhou received PKB; the atmosphere was 'definitely chilly'.
PKB writes, 'He then said that the conflict had to stop, it had to end! He had therefore written a letter to Mr Nehru with three proposals: 1. The two countries should immediately agree to respect 'the line of actual control', and their armed forces should disengage and withdraw 20 km from this line; 2. The Chinese troops in the eastern sector would withdraw north of the line of actual control; 3. The prime ministers of the two countries should meet to seek a friendly and peaceful settlement.'
In reply PKB presented the Indian viewpoint, adding, 'China had agreed in 1960, when Zhou had visited New Delhi, to maintain the status quo in the North East Frontier Agency area. At this point he interrupted me sharply by saying that it was not true; he had never given such an assurance.'
On November 19 and 20, PKB had two more meetings with Zhou.
In December 1962, PKB was instructed to come to Delhi for the Sri Lankan prime minister's visit; the six non-aligned mediator 'Colombo Powers' -- Myanmar, Cambodia, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia and Sri Lanka -- had advanced proposals to ease India-China tensions.
This was PKB's first visit to Delhi during the assignment. Little wonder PKB felt he did not understand New Delhi's thinking.
On January 7, 1963, PKB was summoned, told that he should come alone.
PKB writes, 'He (Zhou)' was in a pensive mood and somewhat tired, and said... he would like me to carry his very personal and verbal message only for Mr Nehru's ears. He continued that war never solved any problems, but only created new ones... positive steps were urgently required besides public declarations and political statements. Mr Nehru, a man of high philosophy and great vision, and he had known each other personally over a period of many years. He understood Mr Nehru's current political predicaments, but Mr Nehru should try and understand his (Zhou en-Lai's) position as well. Mr Nehru should help Mr Zhou en-Lai's hand, and a hand extended in friendship and cooperation...'
'1. For the next three months, Mr Nehru and he would stop making negative statements about each other's country although this may not stop others from making statements of counter-productive nature. 2. Mr Nehru and he should meet as soon as possible with only a small entourage, away from the press and publicity, in an agreed place, in order to exchange ideas for an agreed and joint action to defuse the current situation. This meeting in total privacy should last no longer than two days. 3. After this meeting, which would further ensure in every way the strengthening of the cease-fire line, the two governments would draw up a programme where they could jointly cooperate in areas like trade, science, culture and technology...'
'When the climate for mutual trust had been created, then the border disputes would be discussed, on a sector to sector basis, by the two countries... He requested me again to give this strictly private and personal message directly to Mr Nehru.'
PKB decided to tell no one in Delhi about the content of Zhou's message, not even Foreign Secretary M J Desai. He met Nehru several times, '(Nehru) wanted me to go with him to his office in South Block. In the car he... was mumbling to himself, "What went wrong, where did I go wrong?" During my stay in New Delhi, I was with Mr Nehru a number of times, and used to hear this type of monologue...'
'(Some days later, at the prime minister's residence) He asked me about the message sent by Zhou en-Lai... immediately after the meeting with Chou, I had myself typed out so that no point might be missed... I gave him the one-page typed message which I carried constantly with me inside my wallet. He started reading it... going over it a few times. He then put down the paper on the table near him and seemed lost in thought...'
'He returned from his thoughts, looked at me and said that it was not possible since matters had gone too far. He added that during my stay I had met members of the government and the Opposition, press people, as well as ordinary citizens, and surely I must have reached the same conclusion that no one in India would stand anymore Chinese bluff and all nonsense.'
'He briefly recalled his efforts to help China with goodwill and friendship, and his close association with Zhou en-Lai, whose betrayal had led to fraudulent territorial claims by China and the invasion of India. He gave descriptions of meetings and details of discussions and negotiations with Zhou en-Lai. It was a melancholy monologue...'
'(At a meeting some days later) He asked me if I had mentioned or shown the substance of Zhou en-Lai's message to anyone. I said that I had not. He struck a match, and held the paper to the flames and burnt it over a large crystal ashtray. He said that from the Indian side it would take more than a quarter of a century to return to any substantive negotiation, provided the Chinese refrained from another attack on India.'
PKB returned to Beijing on January 28, 1963, and was summoned to meet Premier Zhou a few days later.
'He asked whether I had given his verbal message to Mr Nehru personally and wanted to know the response. I told him briefly about the current atmosphere in India, and gave him an outline of Mr Nehru's reply, namely, that as a first step, China should, like India, acccept the Colombo proposals in toto. India had announced her acceptance on January 27. After China's acceptance in toto and after the required implementation was completed by both countries, the second step would be to discuss other matters.'
'Zhou en-Lai was visibly excited, if not angry, and said he had done everything within his power and that India would be responsible for future stalemates and complications. He said that he would now write formally to Mr Nehru on the matter.'
PKB had three more meetings with Zhou in 1963, but efforts at dialogue were over. On December 17, 1963, Zhou, unusually, received PKB for a farewell call; I was one of four officials that accompanied him.
In a cordial mood, Zhou said he was sorry to see PKB leave and invited him to come again as his guest. About a year later, China was immersed in the Cultural Revolution.
The Chinese premier never received any other Indian resident envoy. India next surfaced in Beijing's agenda with Mao's 1970 May Day gesture -- an event that also produced its misreading, but that is for another day.

Kishan S Rana is a former ambassador, author, teacher and honorary fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi.
Kishan S Rana
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