Monday, 7 December 2015

7th DEC 1856 FIRST WIDOW REMARRIED IN KOLKATA

SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, 2015

HOUSE OF THE FIRST WIDOW REMARRIAGE ... Breaking the Social Anathema !!

"Benche Thak Vidyasagar Chirojibi Hoye 
Sodore Koreche Report, Bidhobar Hobe Biye"
(Long Live Vidyasagar for the Initiative taken, 
Now the Widow can get married again)

This mid-nineteenth century Bengali couplet refers to the historic episode that we all read about in school level history. The Widow Remarriage Act, 1856, passed at the initiative of Pandit Iswarchandra Vidyasagar, permitted the Hindu widows to get remarried, legally.

29th July, 2015 was the 125th death anniversary of Iswarchandra Vidyasagar. This article is WANDERLUST's little homage to the Lionhearted Man of Steel.


Under the patriarchal system of Indian Society, Women were subjected to various customs, rituals, prejudices since long. Practices like Child Marriages, Sati, Jauhar, Purdah, Prohibition on Remarriage by widows put their life into an ordeal. The condition of the Hindu widows were probably the worst. Polygamy and Child marriages were a widespread practice then. Often after the demise of first wife, old men get married mostly to a girl child, whose age could be as low as 8 or 10. As an obvious consequence, after the eventual death of husband, the young widow was either forced to commit suicide as Sati (in case of upper caste families) or lived the remaining life full of penances as a widow, secluded from the society. 

Hindu widows especially were faced with a battery of societal taboos; higher their caste, the more restrictions widows faced. Traditionally when a man died, his widow was expected to sacrifice all earthly pleasures. Most ironically it was the widow who was cursed for her husband's death! They were expected to wear only simple white sarees for the rest of their lives. They can no longer wear any jewellery or may not even be able to wear a blouse under her saree. An orthodox widow may be expected to cut her hair or even shave her head. Her diet was also strictly restricted andforbidden to eat meat, fish or egg. She was also expected to fast several times a month. In addition a widow was considered inauspicious and werenot permitted to attend the rituals and celebrations.

The very first blow against these prejudices came in the form of BENGAL SATI REGULATION, 1829 passed by the then Governor General Lord William Bentinck at the initiative of Raja Rammohan Roy, prohibiting the Satidaha Pratha or Practice of Sati in all jurisdictions of British India and making it subject to prosecution.

The next giant leap towards the women empowerment was by none other than Pandit Iswarchandra Vidyasagar. Being an impassioned supporter of female education and an opponent of polygamy, he devoted his life to improve the status of hindu widows and wrote lengthy tracts, substantiating his positions with scriptural citing and historical data. 15000 copies of his first tract supporting widow remarriage were sold out in 3 reprints but still people were not convinced. But Vidyasagar pressed on and urged the British to pass a legislation that will allow the Hindu widows to remarry. It was met with strong disapproval from the anti-reformists throughout the country. Despite such a powerful opposition, Vidyasagar sent an application to the Indian Legislative Council signed by 987 people for the promulgation of the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act. The last signatory to the 18 page memorandum was Vidyasagar himself. The members of the council finally decided to support the enlightened minority and passed the HINDU WIDOWS' REMARRIAGE ACT, 1856.


HOUSE OF FIRST WIDOW REMARRIAGE -

HOUSE OF FIRST WIDOW REMARRIAGE AT 48, KAILASH BOSE STREET (PREVIOUSLY 12, SUKEAS STREET)
Now it was the time to set an example. The first widow remarriage took place following hindu customs and traditions, between Srischandra Vidyaratna Bhattacharya, son of Ramdhan Tarkabagish, a close friend of Vidyasagar and 10 year old Kalimati, daughter of Brahmanda Mukherjee and Lachmani Devi. It took place on Sunday, 7th December, 1856 or 12th of Agrahayan, 1263 as per Bengali Calendar at 12 Sukeas Street (now 48 Kailash Bose Street) in North Calcutta. Invitees were about 800.

Kalimati was first married when she was only four and had lost her husband when she was six. Srischandra was holding a job as the assistant secretary of Sanskrit College. The house belonged to Rajkrishna Bannerjee, who often invited Vidyasagar to have lunch at his place. Kalimati and her mother were at Bannerjee's residence. The bridegroom came to Calcutta and stayed at Ramgopal Ghose's house. On Sunday, several pandits and dignitaries assembled at the reception. Sukeas Street and its surrounding areas were over crowded with thousands taking to the streets to get a glimpse of the groom who would be the first to tie the knot with a widow. Vidyasagar had foreseen such a large gathering and was aware that he would have to counter various other obstacles so he sought the help of the police, who closely guarded the road which the groom and his party would use.



Eventually the groom and his accompanists, along with Ramgopal Ghose,Sambhunath Pandit, Dwarakanath Mitra and other friends of Vidyasagar, entered the venue. Jai Narayan Tarkapanchanan, Bharatchandra Siromoni, Premchandra Tarkabagish and Taranath Bachaspati were among the well-known Sanskrit scholars who were present on the day of the wedding. The first widow remarriage evoked a mixed reaction. The Tattwabodhini and the Bengal Spectator were all in praise for Vidyasagar.

From its reports we come to know that Vidyasagar gifted the bride her nuptial sari and ornaments and defrayed other expenses of the marriage. 



The House of the First Widow Remarriage is still there at Kailash Bose Street, though a little altered in the character. The house is now divided into 3 parts. The back portion, in white, having entrance on Jadunath Sen Lane is owned by Sarba Bharatiya Sangeet-O-Sanskriti Parishad since 1983. The frontal part is divided in two. The right segment of the building in yellow bearing address 48A is still under the ownership of the descendants of Raj Krishna Bannerjee while the left segment i.e. 48B found its new owners, at sometime during the last decade. Being born and brought up in the very same neighbourhood, I can distinctly remember the marble plaque on the top of one of the gateway, commemorating the historical event of 1856 but now it was removed, probably during the renovation work.

But an interesting anecdote is though the marriage taking place on that particular day was indeed the first widow remarriage after the legislation was passed, Dakshinaranjan Mukhopadhyay, a key member of Derozio's Young Bengal had already done the unthinkable. He had married the queen of Burdwan, Basanta Kumari, the widow of King Tejchandra, two decades before the enactment of the legislation. Himself being a Brahmin had married not only a widow but outside his caste, that too for love.

Pandit Iswarchandra Vidyasagar personified the best of nineteenth century social reformers; arguing for social change he demonstrated as 'untiring will for positive social action'.


Acknowledgements:
  • Hidden Calcutta by Rathin Mitra
  • Vidyasagar by Chandi Charan Bandyopadhyay
  • Article 'First Widow Remarriage' by Anindita Mazumder in Kolkata on Wheels Magazine
  • www.wikipedia.org
Polygamy (especially among Kulin Brahmins) and child marriage were common practices in Bengal in early 19th century. Girls were typically married off at a very early age and often to old men. Consequently, young widows came to constitute a large proportion of the population.1 These widows were typically condemned to a life of harsh austerity, especially when they belonged to caste Hindu households. As a result, illegitimate births and infanticide had become commonplace. Furthermore, many young widows used to die while attempting abortion. A number of social reformers tried to address the problem of widows. Rammohan Roy initiated a movement for Widow Remarriage (WR) in the 1820s, as did Derozio and the Young Bengal in the 1830s. The Indian Law Commission (1837) considered the issue seriously and came up with the conclusion that infanticide could be curbed only if WR was legalized. The government concluded that, even though such a law was socially highly desirable, passing it would involve going against Hindu strictures and laws of inheritance (Dayabhaag) and hence infeasible.2 There were scattered attempts to legalize WR in the 1840s as well. Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar (ICV) took up the issue in the 1850s. On 4th October 1855, ICV sent a petition signed by 987 individuals to the government and organized an extensive campaign. Despite much opposition from conservative sections, the Widow Remarriage Act was passed on 26th July 1856, permitting WR to be performed in the same way as a first marriage. It was a permission law: modalities such as the registration procedure were left quite unaddressed. The Act had two main provisions. First, WR would be legally valid and the offspring would be legal. Second, the widow would forfeit all claims to wealth and/or financial support inherited through earlier marriages.3 The first WR took place on 7th December 1856 in Calcutta. Quite a 1 Tables 1 and 2 provide an idea about the magnitude of the problem. See also Ghosh (1962 - 66), Ghosh (1973), Gupta (1958), Mitra (1902), Sen (1977) and Sinha (1967). Ghosh (1962 – 66) and Basu (2003) discuss debates on the issue published in contemporary newspapers and periodicals. 2 For details on the Hindu Widow's right of succession, see appendix B. 3 Summary Statement (for details see appendix C). 2 few WRs occurred in 1857. However, overall, the movement was a failure. Only about 80 widows were remarried in Bengal over a span of 20 years, and only about 500 WRs had taken place by 1889. Why did the movement launched by ICV, despite its legal success, fail to remarry widows on any significant scale? The standard explanation runs along the following lines: not many men were willing to marry widows because of prevailing social norms. Thus, popular conservatism generated a lack of demand for widows on the marriage market. The purpose of this paper is to question this received wisdom. We argue, on the basis of demographic evidence, that contemporary society contained too many single men for this to be a plausible (or at least complete) answer. We advance an alternative explanation, which focuses instead on the supply side of the marriage market. We argue that gaps in the WR Act made it impossible to prevent opportunistic men from marrying widows and subsequently deserting them. Widows (or their parents) considered this possibility and were consequently reluctant to remarry. Thus, an adverse selection problem in the marriage market led to very few transactions actually taking place, even though there remained great scope for welfare enhancing remarriages. The market failed to implement any efficient matching outcome. Section 2 discusses the traditional, demand side, argument. We introduce our alternative explanation in Section 3. Section 4 presents an analytical model to formalize and explicate our argument. We briefly discuss the present day scenario in the WR market in light of our analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The data are presented in tabular form after section 6. Several appendices present additional relevant material. 2. ‘SHE COULDN’T’: THE DEMAND SIDE STORY In the standard narrative on the failure of the WR Act, the usual culprit is the potential groom. Apparently, in the face of conservative hostility and large dowry gains from Virgin Marriage (VM), the single Hindu male population of Bengal did not find WR attractive. The argument has the following structure. VM provided high dowries. Hence, given (a) the large cost from subsequent social sanctions, and (b) the forfeiture clause in the WR Act, grooms would have accepted widows only if they were paid even 3 higher dowries. Parents of widows were reluctant to pay such high dowries. Hence, for WR to occur on an extensive scale, third party individuals were required to incentivize grooms through subsidies. Such third party altruists were however not available in sufficient numbers. This understanding was common among contemporaries. The Bengali newspaper Somprakash argued in this vein, as did Risley (1891). It led ICV himself to spend about Rs 1500 for each WR (Rs. 85,000 in 60 WRs) over the period 1856 - 1868.4 Other eminent individuals such as the Maharaja of Bardhaman also decided to provide cash prizes and job offers to men who married widows. While hardly ever articulated in such terms, the thrust of the traditional argument also appears to de-emphasize any suggestion of a market failure. The opportunity cost to grooms of marrying widows was greater than their parents’ willingness to pay. Hence, there did not exist any scope for Pareto-improving transactions in the remarriage market for widows. Remarriage contracts did not arise because such contracts would have been inefficient. The key element in this line of argumentation is evidently the premise that Hindu grooms found VM both easy and lucrative. Contemporary commentators repeatedly asserted that dowry rates for VM were high, and that such matches were easily available. Yet demographic evidence appears to belie such claims. Tables 1 and 2 present demographic data from the Census of 1881. First notice that less than 20% of the Hindu male population of Bengal in 1881 was above 40, while less than 10% was above 50. Thus, the average Hindu male of that period would have been quite lucky to live beyond the age of 40. Given such a short average life span, one would expect contemporary men to have been quite desperate to get married by the age of 30. Yet, the Census data show that about 20% of Hindu males in the 25-29 age group were single, while 40% were in that state in the 20-24 age bracket. This proportion was large even in the 30-39 age bracket, being close to 8%. The 4 corresponding proportion for the 15-19 age bracket was around 70%. Furthermore, the female to male sex ratio declined with age up to the age group 30 – 39. Among the Brahmins, who comprised 6% of the population, females were actually in short supply (the sex ratio was 99.13, significantly below that for the population as a whole). A similar picture is revealed if we look at Calcutta in particular (see table 3) as well as the 1891 (1893) Census of Bengal. Amritabazar Patrika in 1889 reported large numbers of applications from men seeking widows for marriage, with Brahmins accounting for the highest proportion of applicants. Thus, the evidence suggests a large excess supply of grooms in the marriage market, especially among Brahmins. Consequently, the argument that men in general could easily find lucrative VM matches in the contemporary marriage market appears quite dubious. One might argue that cultural norms and conservative sanctions led many young men to prefer staying single to marrying widows. However, in light of the (even stronger) cultural and religious emphasis on marriage and fatherhood, as well the tangible old age economic benefits from having children, such preferences do not appear plausible either. 3. ‘SHE DIDN’T’: A SUPPLY-SIDE PERSPECTIVE As mentioned earlier, the WR Act was a permission law – it did not require the marriage to be registered. Registration would have automatically brought WR under the ambit of the Civil Marriage law, which outlawed polygamy. However, the Hindu Personal Law continued to allow polygamy for a century after the passage of the WR Act. Thus, the husband of a widow, having married her under the Hindu Personal Code, was left legally free to engage in polygamy. Of course, even compulsory registration may have been difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, the WR Act did not provide even this minimal deterrent to polygamy.5 The law was thus open to abuse. Many individuals did indeed use WR as a way to polygamy, and subsequently deserted or ill-treated the widows they had married. 4 To put this number in perspective, note that a lucrative job in the bureaucracy paid Rs 100-150 per month in 1856 (Tatwabodhini). 5 The Young Bengal group, unlike ICV, did have the foresight to suggest a registration clause in the WR law. 5 This immediately opens up an alternative, supply side explanation for the failure of the WR Act. Consider the situation where the widow (or her parents) cannot distinguish a priori between a polygamous suitor and a monogamous one. All men who marry widows suffer some cost due to social sanctions imposed by conservative elements. However, this cost is lower for polygamous men, since they are going to desert the widow and marry again in the future. Consequently, it is likely that more polygamous men would be willing to marry the widow than monogamous ones. Consequently, on average, the widow is likely to end up marrying a polygamous man, who will subsequently desert her or otherwise ill-treat her, if she does attempt to remarry. Knowing this, widows or their parents might be reluctant to entertain marriage offers. Few widows would thus enter the marriage market, despite the presence of a large number of potential suitors. The market would fail to implement feasible welfare gains from remarriage due to the presence of informational asymmetries. Seen in this light, the issue acquires the contours of a classic adverse selection problem. We now proceed to clarify this adverse selection aspect in terms of a formal model. 4. THE MODEL Let there be two types of grooms: monogamous (M) and polygamous (P). P grooms would desert the bride after marriage (or otherwise ill-treat her), whereas M grooms would not. The population of M grooms has measure 1, whereas that of P grooms has measure p. The population of widows is also assumed to have measure 1. All widows are identical; all grooms are observationally identical as well. Parents of a widow put a monetary value of X on her acquiring an M match. Thus, X is also their willingness (and ability) to pay for an M match. Parents receive L if widows marry P grooms, L < 0, and 0 if widows remain unmarried. Let W V d , denote, respectively, the dowry rates for WR d and VM. Parents are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers. Thus, parents are better off without remarriage if only P grooms are available, but would prefer to remarry their daughters if they can find M grooms. M grooms receive the monetary equivalent of [ ] W − s + d if they marry a widow, where s is an individual-specific variable, distributed according to the continuous distribution 6 function F( )s over the interval [ ] s,s , 0 < s < s , V s ≤ X − d . This idiosyncratic variable s measures the total cost suffered by the groom if he marries a widow, whether due to external social sanctions or from having internalized prevalent conservative prejudices. M grooms receive V d if they opt for VM. Notice that, by assumption, (i) the M groom population is of the same size as the W population, and (ii) parents’ willingness to pay a premium over the VM dowry rate ( ) V X − d to marry off a widowed daughter is not less than an M groom’s willingness to accept (s). Thus, if groom types were common knowledge, all widows would be matched with M grooms. We shall show that asymmetric information leads instead to all widows staying single – an inefficient outcome. P grooms receive [ ] W − s + t + d if they marry a widow, where s is distributed according to F( )s , as before, and t is some constant, t < s. By deserting the widow soon after marriage (or otherwise ill-treating her), P grooms can reduce their idiosyncratic cost by some magnitude t, assumed constant for simplicity.6 P grooms also receive V d if they opt for VM. Notice that, due to the idiosyncratic cost being positive, no groom would marry a widow if W V d ≤ d . Thus, parents have to pay a higher dowry for remarriages than for first marriages, should they opt to remarry their daughters. The forfeiture clause in the WR Act increased the cost to parents in.
REMARRIAGE OF WIDOWS LEGALIZED
On July 16th 1856, the remarriage of Hindu widows was legalized across all jurisdictions under the rule of the East India Company.

Hindu widows for many years were subject to extreme hardships including the practice of sati, a social funeral practice, which required a widow to immolate herself on the funeral pyre of her husband. Sati was finally banned in 1826 due a joint effort by social and religious reformer Raja Ram Mohan Roy and the British, who condemned this inhuman practice. 

Child marriage was highly prevalent in medieval India, given the turbulent political situation and the abduction and forced conversion of many young girls by Muslim rulers. Child marriage was looked at as a solution and girls as young as eight or nine were married off, in many cases to men much older than themselves. Upon the death of their husbands these young widows were condemned to a life of extreme drudgery. Higher caste Hindus, among whom child marriage was highly prevalent, prohibited widow remarriage and the child bride was destined to a life of eternal widowhood.  

Even though sati was banned, this is no way made the lives of widows any easier. Hindu widows were considered extremely inauspicious and it was believed that they were paying for the sins of their previous life by the death of their husbands and were the reason why their parents-in-law lost their son. These widows were condemned to a life of prayer and fasting and were not invited to be part of any weddings or celebrations, which were extremely common in Hindu families. Widows had to undergo a complete change in their appearance, in most cases their hair was shaved off and they had to wear a coarse, white sari.

The Hindu Widow Remarriage Act was legalized on July 16th 1856 and was enacted on July 25th the same year. This cause was championed by Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, an important figure of the Bengal Renaissance. Vidyasagar went ahead and provided legal safeguards ensuring that widows do not lose out on any inheritance that they were entitled to by their deceased husbands. However, according to the act, widows were to give up any such inheritance. This act was particularly targeted at child widows whose husbands had died before the consummation of the marriage.

Also On This Day:

1905: A decision to boycott British-made goods is taken at Bagarhat.

1909: Aruna Asaf Ali, social worker and freedom fighter, is born at Kalka, Haryana.

1954: French rule ends in Mahe with de facto power being transferred to the people and the Indian flag hoisted.

1992: Hindi author, producer and director Amar Verma dies.
Widow Nandi and other stories
By Anu Kumar
In Calcutta, it was Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar who launched the campaign to remove the ban on widow remarriage. In the 1850s, he began, like other social reformers, by writing a pamphlet in Bengali showing that remarriage had the sanction of the shastras; he even debated the issue with Hindu priests in Sanskrit. The debate was taken up by the vernacular press and, soon, songs were heard both praising and lambasting the campaign and its leader, Vidyasagar.  The latter also translated his work into English and gave copies of it to British officials. On their advice, he submitted a petition to the governor general in 1855 asking for a law to be passed recognising widow remarriage.
That same year, a draft Bill was introduced in the legislative council by J P Grant, based on Vidyasagar’s petition. Grant also quoted two Englishmen -- Ward, who said the ban forced many widows into prostitution, and Major Wilkinson who claimed he was repeating the opinions of a Brahmin in Nagpur who said that the ban “leads to great moral depravity and vice”.
More than 40 petitions were submitted against the Bill by around 60,000 ‘higher class’ Hindus. The argument that the ban on widow remarriage led to ‘depravation’ was not referred to by most of these petitions which set out to prove that it was enjoined by the shastras and that any change in the law as it stood would mean an interference with Hindu custom.
The Bill was passed in 1856, although not many remarriages resulted from it.
A Widow Remarriage Society did its best to help maintain what was practically a Widow Remarriage Bureau. The reformers themselves found practice more difficult than preaching. A young reformer announced to the cheers of his audience that he would only marry a widow. The Widow Remarriage Bureau offered him first choice. Before the marriage took place, the reformer invited his best friends to dinner. How many of you, he asked, will accept my invitation to dinner after I am married? Not one person was willing. The marriage never took place.
In effect, the Act made remarriage more difficult for widows belonging to castes and tribes that had never placed a ban on widow remarriage. Why? Because once the law was framed and came into effect, it overruled all the ‘customary’ laws that various groups in India followed. These were laws that were not laid down but were followed because of existing traditions and customs practised by the particular tribe or group. As the fine print showed, the Act accorded all Hindu widows the right to remarry; it added a clause classifying the kinds of property a widow had rights to upon remarriage. If her property had come to her from her natal family, or been given to her absolutely, she was entitled to keep it on remarriage. If, on the other hand, it came to her from her husband, or his lineal successors, it would cease to be hers on remarriage unless she was ‘expressly permitted’ to keep it.
In an interesting ruling in 1889, the Allahabad High Court established what would become a precedent for this court and lower courts. This was the famous Har Saran Das v Nandi case where Nandi, the widow of a sweeper, took over her deceased husband’s interest in twokothas of land and later remarried. Her late husband’s brothers contested her right to the property following her remarriage. The high court overturned the decision of two lower courts and decided in favour of Nandi. The court’s position was that the Widow Remarriage Act of 1856 did not apply to castes where customary law had permitted widow remarriage prior to 1856, and that in order for a remarried widow subject to customary law to be deprived of property to which she had succeeded as heir of her first husband, a custom decreeing such forfeiture must be proved. However, in an altogether different twist, the Madras and Calcutta high courts distanced themselves from this ruling. Thus it came to be that the social consequences of the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act varied according to the geographical jurisdiction of the high courts.
Within the jurisdictions of the high courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, the result was the displacement of customary law regarding remarriage and the establishment instead of high caste Hindu values that held widow remarriage in low esteem and insisted on a penalty (in this case, losing inheritance rights) being imposed if a remarriage did occur. Moreover, few women from the upper castes availed of their new right to remarry, while those widows who, in exercise of their customary rights, remarried independent of the law found themselves subject to the forfeiture clause, regardless of their customary law. 
Towards the 1890s, in Bengal where the initiative for widow remarriage began, it was observed that a large number of widows were still being forced to live celibate and austere lives despite the reform endeavours of men like Ram Mohun Roy, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and others. The Act of 1856 did make widow remarriage legal, but it could not make widow remarriage socially acceptable. Nor was it possible to enforce it with the help of the police. This was not like the movement for the abolition of sati, which was backed by law-enforcers and invited severe penalties. In the 1890s, it was reported that 40 years since the Bill was passed there had only been 500 widow remarriages.
The Hindu Code Bill of Independent India (1955) superseded the Widow Remarriage Act of 1856. Nothing in the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 restricts widow remarriage. Moreover, nothing in either the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) or the Hindu Succession Act (1956) provides for the forfeiture of property inherited by a woman from her first husband upon her subsequent remarriage.
(Anu Kumar is a writer and journalist based in Delhi)
Infochange News & Features, September 2009
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